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The Runway to Settlement 
REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS IN AIRLINE BANKRUPTCIES  
INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades, every major U.S. airline has 
engaged in some type of restructuring in an attempt to avoid 
the termination of its business.1  These airlines have been 
relatively successful in keeping their businesses alive through 
a combination of responsive business decisions and timely legal 
maneuvering.2  One of the airlines’ most effective means for 
doing so is acquiring cost-cutting concessions from their labor 
forces, which are their greatest source of financial difficulty.3  
These concessions can be acquired in a variety of ways such as 
bargaining, mediation, and arbitration.4  When these methods 
are not successful, some airlines have chosen judicial 
intervention as an emergency measure.5   
In August of 2006, Northwest Airlines’ request for such 
emergency intervention almost backfired when a bankruptcy 
  
 1 Highlights of these airlines’ restructuring over the past two decades 
include: American Airlines’ purchase of Trans World Airlines (TWA) in 2001, currently 
in workout with creditors to return to profitability; Continental Airlines filing 
bankruptcy in 1983 and emerging in 1986, filing for bankruptcy in 1990 and emerging 
in 1993; United Airlines filing for bankruptcy in 2002 and emerging in 2006; Northwest 
Airlines filing for bankruptcy in 2005 and remaining under bankruptcy “protection”; 
US Airways failing to sell-out to United Airlines in 2001, filing for bankruptcy in 2002 
and remaining under bankruptcy “protection,” merging with America West Airlines in 
2005; Delta Air Lines engaging in extensive workouts in 2004 to avoid bankruptcy, 
filing for bankruptcy in 2005.   
 2 Recently, the major airlines have considered mergers as a means to 
streamline their operations and remain solvent.  See Jeff Bailey & Don Philips, Big 
Consolidated Airline, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at C1. 
 3 The primary concessions that airlines seek from their workforce are 
reductions in hourly salaries, increases in employee contributions to pension plans and 
changes in working conditions (i.e., more working hours).  See, e.g., Jeff Bailey, 
Northwest Air Flight Attendants Reject Contract Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at 
C4; Wage Cuts Approved for Comair Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at C9. 
 4 These processes are explicitly required by The Railway Labor Act.  See 
discussion infra Parts II.A.1, III.A.3. 
 5 This is explicitly permitted by the Bankruptcy Code when an airline is 
operating in bankruptcy.  See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
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court ruling threatened the airline’s ability to acquire these 
crucial labor-related concessions.6  Fortunately, upon realizing 
the error of the bankruptcy court’s decision in both legal 
analysis and public policy, the district court reversed the 
bankruptcy court.7  The district court’s decision, as opposed to 
that of the bankruptcy court, reflects a proper understanding of 
the juxtaposition of bankruptcy law and labor law in the 
unique context of the airline industry.  Thanks to that 
reversal—which was affirmed by the Second Circuit8—the 
airlines will continue to be able to acquire these important 
labor-related concessions, which are vital to ensuring that the 
public has reliable air transportation. 
This Note argues that the Northwest Airlines case 
provides the correct framework for limiting the effect of labor 
disputes on airline employees, the airline itself, and the 
traveling public.  Part I provides background information by 
briefly describing the nature of the major airline business and 
then outlining the primary reasons for these airlines’ financial 
troubles.  Part II reviews the statutes and facts relevant to the 
Northwest Airlines case and summarizes the courts’ opinions in 
that case.  Next, in order to appreciate the consequences of the 
final disposition of that case, Part III analyzes the bargaining 
relationship between the airline and the union before the 
airline requests emergency court intervention.  This bargaining 
relationship is critical because it is determinative of each 
party’s ability to earn concessions and reach a settlement.  This 
Note suggests that the bargaining relationship between the 
union and the airline prior to judicial intervention produces a 
desirable status quo.  Finally, Part IV analyzes the 
consequences of the Northwest Airlines decision on that 
bargaining relationship and status quo.  In doing so, this Note 
argues that the Second Circuit’s decision helps maintain that 
status quo after emergency court intervention and provides a 
  
 6 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 
349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 
2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007).  Hereinafter, the collection of court decisions 
and underlying facts concerning the labor dispute between Northwest Airlines and the 
flight attendants’ unions will be referred to collectively as the “Northwest Airlines” 
case. 
 7 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ 
F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 
2007). 
 8 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-
4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007). 
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step in the right direction toward more reliable air 
transportation. 
I. THE LEGACY CARRIER 
The six major U.S. airlines are often referred to as 
“legacy carriers.”9  These airlines include American Airlines, 
United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Continental Airlines, 
Northwest Airlines, and US Airways.10  The term legacy carrier 
is often used in conjunction with and compared to “low-cost 
carriers” such as Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, ATA 
Airlines, and Spirit Airlines.11  As the name implies, legacy 
carriers have been flying for significantly longer than the low-
cost carriers.  In addition, the legacy carriers have traditionally 
offered “premium services” to its customers such as first- and 
business-class service, on-board meals, more convenient 
schedules and airport locations, and generous compensation 
and pension packages for their employees.12  In the past, 
customers were willing to pay a premium in the form of higher 
ticket prices for these services.13   
Low-cost carriers, on the other hand, are primarily an 
invention of the past decade and offer “no-frills” or fewer 
premium services than their legacy counterparts.14  In turn, the 
low-cost carriers are able to offer their services at a reduced 
cost to the customer.15  Within the past decade, a price war has 
  
 9 See OFF. OF AVIATION AND INT’L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
AVIATION ANALYSIS: LEGACY CARRIER REVENUE PREMIUMS, FOURTH QUARTER 2002, 
at 1 (2002), available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/domestic-competition/4Q02-
LegacyCarrierPremiums.pdf [hereinafter DOT ANALYSIS]. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO’S AIRLINE AND AIRPORT 
STUDIES: ACI-NA ANNUAL CONFERENCE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 4 (Sept. 25, 
2006), available at http://www.aci-na.org/dexa/docs/Aussendorf.pdf [hereinafter GAO 
STUDY]. 
 13 See DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
 14 Id. at 1; see also Lisa Catherine Tulk, Comment, The 1926 Railway Labor 
Act and the Modern American Airline Industry: Changes and “CHAOS” Outline the 
Need for Revised Legislation, 69 J. AIR L. AND COM. 615, 635 (2004).  One must be 
careful, however, not to automatically construe “no-frills” service as “low-quality” 
service.  For example, “the service quality differential between low-fare carriers and 
legacy carriers has narrowed as certain low-fare carriers have, to various degrees, 
improved their product by flying newer planes, installing premium cabins, initiating or 
improving frequent flyer programs, offering improved in-flight amenities such as live 
television, offering less restrictive rules for changing tickets, and increasing both the 
density and the scope of their networks.”  DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1. 
 15 DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1.  
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developed between legacy and low-cost carriers that has forced 
some of the legacy carriers to reevaluate their business models 
and scale back some of their “premium” offerings.16  In addition, 
as a result of the competition that the low-cost carriers have 
generated, demand for premium services has fallen, and, 
consequently, customers are no longer willing to pay the 
premium to travel on “name-brand” legacy carriers.17   
Low-cost competition is not the only source of the legacy 
carriers’ financial difficulties. The prevailing political and 
economic climate also affects an airline’s profits.18  Three 
decades ago, the Airline Deregulation Act of 197819 forced the 
established legacy carriers to cope with low demand that had 
resulted from the insurgence of competition in the market.20  
After September 11, 2001, geopolitical instability, threats of 
terrorist activity, and economic stagnation further reduced 
demand for air travel.21  Recent instability in the Middle East 
has also reduced the airlines’ profit margin because 
exponentially rising fuel costs have caused their operating 
expenses to skyrocket.22   
  
 16 See id. at 1-2; Tulk, supra note 14, at 635-36.  For example, many of the 
legacy carriers have reduced their operating costs by scaling back in-flight catering, 
particularly on domestic routes.  See LUFTHANSA, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2004), 
available at http://konzern.lufthansa.com/en/downloads/presse/downloads/publikationen/ 
lh_gb_2004.pdf.  In addition, a few legacy carriers have mimicked their low-cost 
counterparts by eliminating first and business class altogether on some routes.  See 
United Airlines, Press Release, Ted Unmasked: United Airlines Reveals Look & Feel of 
New Low-Fare Service (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://www.travelnewhorizons.com/ 
NHTRAVELER/NHTraveler_12-03.htm#TED%20UNMASKED. 
 17 See DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
 18 See generally Tulk, supra note 14, at 628-36. 
 19 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 20 Tulk, supra note 14, at 629 (“In efforts to reduce operating costs, 
workforces were trimmed and, as a result, unemployment in the aviation industry 
increased.  As time passed and the airline market grew increasingly competitive, 
mergers and bankruptcies became fairly commonplace in the industry . . . .”). 
 21 Id. at 634-35. 
 22 See Commercial Jet Fuel Supply: Impact and Cost on the U.S. Airline 
Industry Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Aviation, 109th Cong. 1, 3 (2006) (memo) 
[hereinafter Impact & Cost] (“[T]he Air Transport Association (ATA) expects jet fuel 
costs to average $70 per barrel or $1.67 per gallon in 2006—a 90-percent increase from 
2001.”).  In January 2006, the average price for a gallon of commercial jet fuel was 
$1.81 per gallon.  Id.  This increase is particularly burdensome because “[a]fter labor, 
jet fuel is the second largest operating expense for all U.S. airlines, constituting 10 to 
25 percent of an airline’s annual operating costs.”  Id.  As of March 6, 2007, the Wall 
Street Journal reported that fuel costs had “eclipsed” labor as the number one expense 
for many airlines.  Susan Carey, Calculating Costs in the Clouds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 
2007, at B1. 
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Increased competition, low overall demand for air 
travel, and high fuel costs have all forced the legacy carriers to 
engage in significant cost-cutting measures in order to remain 
solvent.23  The reduction of premium services,24 however, will 
only get these legacy carriers so far.25  The legacy carriers 
quickly discovered that their only chance of returning to 
profitability was to reduce their existing financial obligations.26  
Legacy carriers are particularly burdened by the collective 
bargaining agreements with their labor unions because these 
agreements were negotiated before every dollar had to be 
squeezed out of the airline.27  In other words, because fiscal 
discipline was not as essential at the time of their formation, 
the market permitted these airlines to indulge their employees 
in generous compensation, retirement, and pension packages.28  
Thus, the legacy carriers need a plan to renegotiate these 
collective bargaining agreements to include terms more 
favorable to their economic recovery.29  Many of the legacy 
carriers have chosen bankruptcy as a means to effectuate that 
labor-cost reduction plan.30   
II. NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORP. V. ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS 
While Northwest Airlines did not enter bankruptcy 
solely to reduce its labor costs, it was certainly a motivating 
factor given that labor is its largest operating expense.31  While 
under bankruptcy protection, a debtor such as Northwest 
Airlines may request court permission to modify its existing 
labor contracts when bargaining has not successfully reduced 
its labor costs.  In August of 2006, Northwest Airlines made 
that exact request.  To decide whether to grant that request, 
  
 23 See Tulk, supra note 14, at 636 (“Many carriers look to concessions from 
labor to keep them afloat while they struggle to catch up with the low-cost carriers.”). 
 24 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 25 See GAO STUDY, supra note 12, at 4 (indicating that legacy carriers have 
not lowered their costs enough to remain solvent). 
 26 See Richard D. Cuhady, The Airlines: Destined to Fail?, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 
3, 11-14 (Winter 2006). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See GAO STUDY, supra note 12, at 9 (citing management and labor 
decisions as one of the “key factors” causing airline labor problems). 
 29 See Cuhady, supra note 26, at 11-14. 
 30 See id.  For a list of the legacy carriers that have declared bankruptcy, see 
supra note 1. 
 31 See supra note 22. 
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the court considered a number of federal statutes and the 
factual circumstances of the bankruptcy case to decide whether 
modification was appropriate relief.  After the requested relief 
was granted, the court had to consult some of those same 
statutes to determine what further action the parties could 
take in the bargaining process. 
A. The Relevant Statutes 
A collective bargaining agreement is simply a type of 
executory contract32 “between an employer and a labor union 
regulating employment conditions” such as wages and work 
rules.33  The collective bargaining process places mutual 
obligations on both the employer and the union.34  Various 
federal statutes establish and enforce these obligations.  
Generally, the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)35 governs the 
mechanics of the collective bargaining process for the railroad 
and airline industries.36  In certain situations, Chapter 11 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code alters the typical collective 
bargaining process under the RLA and gives a debtor “special 
privileges” when it has chosen to operate in bankruptcy.37   
Airlines commonly choose to declare bankruptcy as a means of 
gaining access to these special privileges.38  Specifically, under 
§ 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, an airline may petition the 
court to allow it to “reject” (i.e., breach) an existing collective 
bargaining agreement and substitute more favorable terms.39  
  
 32 An executory contract is “[a] contract that remains wholly unperformed or 
for which there remains something still to be done on both sides.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 33 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 34 See Jeffrey D. Berman, Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 983, 986 n.21 (1985) (citing 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982)). 
 35 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2000). 
 36 For virtually all other industries, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000), governs the collective bargaining process.  See In re Northwest 
Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-
cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007) (“[T]he RLA was 
passed [before the NLRA]; yet rather than adding additional industries to the RLA’s 
framework, Congress created a separate statutory scheme for those industries, the 
NLRA, and expressly carved out employers and employees subject to the RLA from its 
coverage.”). 
 37 For example, the debtor has the right to modify—or “reject”—a preexisting 
collective bargaining agreement against the wishes of the labor union that is a party to 
that agreement.  See discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, infra Part II.A.2. 
 38 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
 39 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000). 
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If the court grants this request, it is not surprising that the 
union would be perturbed by that result and threaten to strike 
to dissuade the airline from taking that action.  It is the 
legality of that potential strike, and the court’s power to enjoin 
it under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (“NLGA”)40 that was the 
primary issue in the Northwest Airlines case.41 
This issue was one of first impression for any 
bankruptcy court.42  To decide whether a strike would be legal 
under these circumstances, the bankruptcy court needed to 
analyze the requirements of the aforementioned statutes, 
which purport to serve multiple functions:  First, they dictate 
the extent to which and when the federal courts may intervene 
in bankruptcy-labor disputes;43 second, they specify the 
mechanics of the negotiating and bargaining process between 
the airline and the union;44 third, provide the remedies (both 
judicial and extra-judicial) that are available to either party if 
one party fails to follow its statutory duties, or if both parties 
have followed their respective statutory duties and deadlock 
remains;45 fourth, they reflect the policy concerns Congress 
considered in enacting all three statutes, supposedly with the 
expectation that they operate in harmony.46   
The reality, however, is that while these statutes (the 
RLA, § 1113, and NLGA) standing alone seem to point to an 
obvious solution for the court, their mandates are considerably 
less clear in the unique situation where they are implicated 
simultaneously.  Prior to addressing their simultaneous 
application, however, it is helpful to consider the statutes 
individually. 
1. The Railway Labor Act 
Since Congress enacted the RLA in 1926 to govern 
collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”),47 the Supreme 
  
 40 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2000). 
 41 Generally, the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibits federal courts from 
enjoining strikes in labor disputes.  See infra Part II.C. 
 42 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333, 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d 
by, 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-
cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007). 
 43 See discussion of the NLGA, infra Part II.A.3. 
 44 See discussion of the RLA, infra Part II.A.1. 
 45 See discussion of the RLA, the Bankruptcy Code § 1113, and the NLGA, 
infra Parts II.A.1., II.A.2., II.A.3. 
 46 See id. 
 47 It was “amended in 1936 to bring the airline industry within the scope of 
its coverage.”  In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 351.  It is undisputed that the 
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Court has acknowledged that its primary goal is to prevent and 
settle strikes in order to avoid interruptions of commerce.48  As 
a means of doing so, the RLA’s strategy is to defer strikes for as 
long as possible in the hope that the parties will reach a 
settlement.49  To accomplish this goal, the RLA imposes 
obligations on both parties when either party is attempting to 
alter the terms of an existing CBA.50  These obligations are 
primarily contained in section 2 and section 6 of the RLA.51   
Section 2 is generally regarded as the “heart of the 
Railway Labor Act”52 and requires each party to make every 
reasonable effort to reach an agreement during the negotiation 
and bargaining process.53  While the scope of that obligation is 
vague “and has been left to the courts to interpret on a case-by-
case basis,”54 section 6 prescribes a detailed scheme of what 
must happen when an airline is engaged in a “labor dispute” 
with a union.55  This scheme explicitly sets time frames and 
notice requirements for bargaining and negotiation and 
requires mandatory mediation, voluntary arbitration, “cooling-
off” periods, and even has the possibility of a Presidential 
Emergency Board.56 While these processes are being exhausted, 
section 6 prohibits both parties from taking any “unilateral” or 
illegal action that would disturb the status quo created by an 
existing CBA.57  In addition, while the parties are engaged in 
mediation with the National Mediation Board (“Mediation 
Board”),58 the mediation cannot be terminated at the will of 
  
Northwest Airlines case, and any other case involving the renegotiation of a CBA with 
airline employees, is governed by the RLA. 
 48 Id. at 352 (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way 
Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 451 (1987)). 
 49 Thomas E. Reinert, Jr., Airline Labor Disruptions: Is the RLA Still 
Adequate?, 15 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (2001). 
 50 See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000) (stating that the RLA procedures are the 
exclusive means to change an existing CBA). 
 51 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 352-55. 
 52 Id. at 352 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal 
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1969)).  
 53 See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926). 
 54 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 352 (citing Chicago & N.W. Ry. 
Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 577 (1971) [hereinafter Chicago & North 
Western]). 
 55 See 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 155, 157, 160 (2000), cited in In re Northwest Airlines 
Corp., 349 B.R. at 353. 
 56 Id. 
 57 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 353 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. 
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989)). 
 58 The National Mediation Board (“NMB”)  
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either party until an “impasse” has been reached.59  It is only 
when the parties have exhausted this “elaborate machinery,”60 
and made “every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement”61 
that the parties may strike.62   
In sum, the RLA expressly prohibits the airline from 
unilaterally amending the terms of a CBA to suit its financial 
needs and prohibits the union from threatening to strike to 
prevent the airline from doing so.  Stated simply, the parties 
are forced to bargain and negotiate for a settlement. 
2. The Bankruptcy Code 
Because the RLA bargaining process can, by design, last 
indefinitely, Congress enacted § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code 
in 1984 as an emergency remedy for debtors.63  Section 1113 is 
  
established by the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act of 1926, is an 
independent agency that performs a central role in facilitating harmonious 
labor-management relations within two of the nation’s key transportation 
modes—the railroads and airlines.  Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, NMB 
programs provide an integrated dispute resolution process to effectively meet 
the statutory objective of minimizing work stoppages in the airline and 
railroad industries. 
  NMB Mission and Key Functions, available at http://www.nmb.gov/ 
publicinfo/mission.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).  
 59 See 45 U.S.C. § 156 (2000); In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 347 . 
 60 Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 
142, 148-49 (1969). 
 61 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 353 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp., 
491 U.S. at 302). 
 62 The Supreme Court has characterized the RLA procedural machinery as a 
“virtually endless ‘negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.’”  
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444-
45 (1987) (quoting Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 148-49). 
 63 Congress enacted § 1113 in response to the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).  In Bildisco, the Court 
resolved the circuit split over the proper standard for allowing a debtor to “reject” a 
collective bargaining agreement.  Prior to the enactment of § 1113, the federal courts 
permitted rejection of collective bargaining agreements under the executory contract 
rejection provision of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000)).  Michael D. Sousa, 
Reconciling the Otherwise Irreconcilable: The Rejection of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 LAB. LAW. 453, 464 n.76 
(2003).  Prior to Bildisco, the various circuit courts required differing levels of necessity 
as a prerequisite to rejection.  While some courts required that the debtor demonstrate 
that the CBA was “onerous and burdensome,” others merely required the debtor to 
demonstrate that the decision was based on a valid “business judgment.”  See id. at 
464; Richard R. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 301, 338 (1985-86).  The Supreme Court in 
Bildisco adopted a middle course between the two possible extremes and established a 
test that “balanced the equities” of both the debtor and the union to determine whether 
rejection was warranted.  See Sousa, supra, at 464.  Following Bildisco, Congress 
responded by passing § 1113, which specifies that a debtor “may assume or reject a 
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one of the “protective” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
because it allows the debtor to relieve itself of burdensome 
collective bargaining agreements.64  Because this relief is likely 
to upset the expectations of the union and its employees, § 1113 
allows a debtor to “reject” an existing CBA only with the 
bankruptcy court’s permission.65  Section 1113 requires that the 
debtor demonstrate, among other things, that the union has no 
“good cause” to refuse the debtor’s proposals.66  In addition, the 
debtor must show that its proposed modifications are 
“necessary” to permit its reorganization and that all affected 
parties are treated “fairly and equitably.”67  If these showings 
are satisfactory, the court may permit the debtor to “reject” 
certain terms of the CBA and substitute new terms that fit the 
above criteria.68  
Section 1113, however, is not the panacea that it seems.  
Since the enactment of § 1113 in 1984, there has been 
uncertainty about the consequences of a court-sanctioned 
rejection.69  For example, § 1113 does not specify whether the 
  
collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section.” 
Id. at 469 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a)).  Section 1113 specifies precise requirements for 
rejection that include, among other things, a requirement that the court must “balance 
the equities.”  See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c). 
 64 Labor is an airline’s single greatest operating expense.  See Impact and 
Cost, supra note 22, at 3. 
 65 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c). 
 66 See Sousa, supra note 63, at 469.  
An application for the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement will be 
approved by the bankruptcy court only if the court finds that 1) prior to the 
hearing on the application, the debtor-in-possession made a proposal for 
modification of the agreement to the employees’ authorized representative; 
2) the authorized representative refused to accept the proposal without good 
cause; and 3) the balance of the equities clearly favors the rejection of the 
[CBA]. 
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)). 
 67 See In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 908-09 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1984) (establishing a framework for considering the various requirements under § 1113). 
 68 While § 1113 does not specify whether a court must reject a CBA in whole 
or in part, the court’s general equity powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 appear to permit the 
court to “reject” whatever part of the CBA is necessary to the carrier’s reorganization.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000). 
 69 This uncertainty stems in part from the fact that this question has never 
been litigated and also due to the apparent contradictions between § 1113, the RLA, 
and the NLGA.  For example, while the RLA forbids either party from altering the 
status quo, the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to change the CBA terms without 
the other party’s acquiescence, which appears to be an alteration of the status quo.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 57, 65; see also In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 
at 345 (“[S]ome actual and potential conflicts of legislative policies and goals have 
arisen from application of two or more of these laws in particular disputes.”); but see 
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parties must continue to negotiate (pursuant to the RLA) after 
a court-sanctioned rejection.  In addition, § 1113 is silent on 
whether a court-sanctioned rejection constitutes a “unilateral 
action,” signaling an end to the RLA process and giving the 
union a legal right to strike despite the fact that the parties 
remain in mediation.  It is precisely this question that a court 
had never been asked to answer before the Northwest Airlines 
case. 
3. The Norris-LaGuardia Act 
If the union does in fact take the position that a CBA 
rejection under § 1113 constitutes a unilateral action and a 
violation of the RLA status quo, it seems natural that the union 
would also take the position that it was now free to take 
unilateral action and threaten to strike.70  The express 
language of the NLGA appears to support this position.71  
Enacted in 1932, the NLGA explicitly removes the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction to issue injunctions in “labor disputes.”72   In 
other words, if the union threatened to strike in protest of the 
court-approved CBA terms, the NLGA appears to render the 
court powerless to stop it.73  Despite this seemingly broad 
jurisdictional prohibition, the courts have developed exceptions 
to the NLGA to allow an injunction in “limited circumstances, 
such as to ‘enjoin violations of the specific mandate of another 
labor statute.’”74  In other words, if either party’s action 
constitutes a violation of the RLA, then the court would have 
the power to enjoin that party’s action.75  
  
infra Part II.C.2 (explaining that there is no contradiction and that the statutes can be 
reconciled).   
 70 In Northwest Airlines, the union took exactly that position.  See Brief of the 
Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA at 16, In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 
(Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)) (“[E]very court that has addressed the issue has 
concluded that an § 1113 contract abrogation precipitates a union’s right to strike.”). 
 71 See 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“No court of the United States . . . shall have 
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a 
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the 
provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.”). 
 72 Id. 
 73 The NLGA “lists specific acts that may not be enjoined, including those 
involving ‘ceasing or refusing to perform any work.’” In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 
349 B.R. at 355 (citing 29 U.S.C. §104(a) (2000)). 
 74 Id. (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way 
Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987)). 
 75 See id. 
1412 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4 
The Northwest Airlines case addresses the legality of 
both parties’ actions in an RLA-bankruptcy labor dispute, 
which is necessary to determine whether the NLGA’s general 
prohibition applies. 
B. Facts of the Northwest Airlines Case 
Northwest Airlines (“the airline”) declared bankruptcy 
in September 2005 for the first time in its history.76  In October 
2005, Northwest sought relief under § 1113, seeking rejection 
of its CBAs with six labor unions.77  The airline subsequently 
reached consensual agreements on modifications of the CBAs 
with five of those unions.78  In March 2006, the airline reached 
an agreement (the “March 1 Agreement”) with the sixth union, 
the Professional Flight Attendants Association (“PFAA”).79   
After a lengthy period of attempted ratification, however, the 
flight attendants voted down the agreement by a margin of 
eighty percent to twenty percent.80  As a result, the airline 
requested that the bankruptcy court rule on its § 1113 motion 
vis-à-vis the PFAA CBA.81  The bankruptcy court agreed with 
the airline that rejection was warranted and, on July 5, 2006, 
ordered the airline to impose terms consistent with the March 
1 Agreement on July 17, 2006.82 
Following the rejection, the flight attendants voted to 
replace the PFAA as their bargaining representative with 
another union, the Association of Flight Attendants (“AFA”).83  
The AFA quickly commenced bargaining, and “after ten days of 
non-stop negotiations,” reached a new agreement with the 
  
 76 See Northwest Airlines, Up Close, History, Timeline, Past and Present, 
http://www.nwa.com/corpinfo/upclose (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
 77 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 335-36. 
 78 Id. at 336. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.  Standard practice is that requesting relief under § 1113 initiates an 
intensive negotiation process that usually leads to out-of-court settlement.  Thus, the 
court may reserve its decision on § 1113 motions until the debtor signals to the court 
that its assistance is either necessary or no longer required.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2) 
(2000) (“The court shall rule on [an] application for rejection within thirty days after 
the date of the commencement of the hearing.  In the interests of justice, the court may 
extend such time for such additional period as the [debtor in possession] and the 
employee’s representative may agree to.”). 
 82 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 336-37.  The court found that 
rejection of the CBA was “necessary” to the airline’s reorganization, the PFAA had no 
“good cause” to reject the March 1 Agreement, and the balance of equities clearly 
favored rejection.  Id. 
 83 Id. at 337. 
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airline on July 17, 2006 (the “July 17 Agreement”).84  While the 
new agreement received the support of the AFA leadership, the 
employees once again voted down the agreement—this time by 
a much narrower margin of fifty-five percent to forty-five 
percent.85 
In response, pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s § 1113 
order, the airline put into effect the new terms consistent with 
the March 1 Agreement.86  In response to that imposition, the 
AFA gave the airline fifteen days notice of its intention to 
strike.87  The AFA made it clear that it intended to implement a 
“CHAOS”-type strike.88  Believing that threat, or an ultimate 
strike to be illegal, the airline filed a motion with the 
bankruptcy court to enjoin the threatened strike activity.89   
  
 84 Id.  “In light of this new agreement, the airline refrained from imposing 
the new terms and conditions of employment that had been authorized by the Court’s 
July 5 order.”  Id. at 337. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id.  In addition, the AFA filed a motion seeking an order that the airline be 
forced to impose the terms of the July 17 Agreement as opposed to the March 1 
Agreement.  Id.   
 88 CHAOS (“Create Havoc Around Our System”) is a course of action 
designed by the AFA flight attendants.  In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 337.  
A CHAOS-type strike consists of  
sporadic and relatively brief work stoppages that are designed to create havoc 
with an airline’s scheduling of flights and to cause the public to lose 
confidence in the ability of the airline to provide reliable service.  At the same 
time, the program is designed to prevent the airline from attempting to 
replace striking workers or take other effective responsive action.  [The 
bankruptcy court found that] . . . the threat of CHAOS would be likely to 
cause the [airline] serious injury, perhaps leading to their liquidation, and 
that it would be highly detrimental to the interest of the public in a sound 
and reliable transportation system. 
Id.  The AFA’s general counsel testified that CHAOS is only intended to “put pressure 
on management” and to “force an agreement” without putting the company out of 
business in the process.  Brief of the Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA at 5, In re 
Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 (Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)).  The 
airline, however, citing statistics provided by the AFA, responded that CHAOS has 
previously had the effect of pushing other airlines “to the brink of collapse,” and 
causing the airline’s traffic to decrease by twenty to twenty-five percent.  Brief of 
Appellants and Brief in Support of an Injunction Pending Appeal at 9-10, In re 
Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 (Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)). 
 89 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 349-50.  
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C. Court Decisions in the Northwest Airlines Case 
1. The Bankruptcy Court 
When asked to enjoin the AFA from engaging in a strike 
following rejection of the CBA, the bankruptcy court refused to 
reach the preliminary injunction issue because it found that 
the NLGA precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction.90  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court noted at the outset that 
“[n]othing in the Bankruptcy Code or in the policies of 
bankruptcy law overrides the provisions of [the NLGA].”91  As 
discussed below, this conclusion was crucial in framing the 
court’s analysis of the intersection of relevant statutes. 
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the 
bankruptcy court acknowledged that the NLGA does not 
universally deprive the courts from enjoining strikes if either 
party violates or threatens to violate the provisions of the 
RLA.92  Ultimately, however, the court found no reason to take 
the case out of the NLGA’s general prohibition because the 
court found that neither party had violated the express 
provisions of the RLA.93  The court reasoned that the airline’s 
decision to seek a rejection remedy under § 1113, while not a 
per se violation of the RLA, and certainly within its rights 
under federal law,94 terminated the parties’ RLA section 6 
negotiation process.95  Thus, while § 1113 technically gave the 
airline a right to break the status quo and substitute court-
approved terms, this action consequently freed the employees 
to strike at will despite the fact that the Mediation Board had 
not released the parties from mediation.96  Therefore, the court 
did not accept the airline’s argument that following § 1113 
rejection, both parties remained bound by the procedural 
  
 90 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333, 344 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d 
by, 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-
cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007). 
 91 Id. at 338. 
 92 Id. at 339-40 (citing Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint. 
of Way Employees, 418 U.S. 429 (1987); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. 
Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)). 
 93 See id. at 343-44 (explaining that a violation of the RLA would have 
occurred if the union had either put the “CHAOS program in effect prior to the 
[d]ebtors’ imposition of new terms and conditions of employment” or if the union had 
refused to bargain in good faith prior to being released from mediation). 
 94 Id. at 344. 
 95 Id. at 343 (“There is . . . nothing in § 1113 that suggests that rejection 
should trigger an implied obligation on the part of the parties to continue to bargain.”). 
 96 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 344. 
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requirements of the RLA to continue to bargain in good faith 
and make every reasonable effort to reach an agreement.97  Put 
simply, the court held that the airline could not have it both 
ways—the airline had the option to stick it out and continue its 
RLA negotiations, or it could take a chance with rejection and 
hope the union would acquiesce.98  The airline could not force 
the union to accept new terms while simultaneously forcing the 
union to sit down and bargain all over again.99 
In short, the bankruptcy court’s conclusion rested on a 
single premise: because no RLA violation had taken place, the 
NLGA’s “default rule” applied and the court was prohibited 
from issuing  an injunction in a “labor dispute.”100  The airline 
immediately appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling.101 
2. The District Court 
The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York convincingly rejected that single premise 
advanced by the bankruptcy court—that no RLA violation had 
occurred—and reversed.102  The district court opinion consisted 
of two parts: a section criticizing the reasoning of the 
bankruptcy court and a section harmonizing all four statutes.103  
  
 97 The airline argued that it was essentially in the “position of a new 
employer without a prior collective bargaining agreement and that they can enforce, by 
injunctive relief, the obligation of the employees . . . to bargain in good faith toward the 
formulation of an agreement.”  Id. at 342. 
 98 See id. at 343. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 101 Bankruptcy judges’ opinions can be appealed to the district court for the 
judicial district on a “clearly erroneous” basis.  If either party is dissatisfied with the 
district court’s decision, the case may be appealed to the court of appeals.  “The Code 
also permits any of the circuit courts to adopt a special appellate procedure whereby 
the first appeal from a bankruptcy court decision is to a panel of bankruptcy judges, 
called Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (“BAP”), and then to the court of appeals.”  See 
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS, TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 113 (11th ed. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 158(c) 
(2000)).  Both parties, however, must consent to appeals to these BAPs.   
 102 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 
___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 
2007). 
 103 This includes the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) because cases 
governed by the NLRA were cited by the AFA in its brief to the court.  See, e.g., Brief of 
the Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA at 12, In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 
(Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)) (citing In re Petrusch, 14 B.R. 825 (N.D.N.Y. 
1981), an NLRA case, for the proposition that “[t]he well established power of the 
reorganization court to issues orders necessary to conserve the power in its custody 
must be exercised within the scope of a jurisdiction which is limited by the broad and 
explicit language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”).  The district court later criticized the 
analogy of Petrusch to the present case.  See infra note 114. 
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The district court’s criticism of the bankruptcy court was 
broken into three subsections.   
First, the district court noted that if the bankruptcy 
court’s reasoning and conclusion were accepted, it would 
deprive the Mediation Board of its vital role in the RLA 
bargaining process.104  Specifically, it would divest the 
Mediation Board of its statutory mandate to make an objective 
determination as a neutral party about when the bargaining 
had reached an impasse, and to “release” the parties from 
mediation so that they may seek self-help.105  Under the 
bankruptcy court’s scheme, if the union itself has the power to 
conclude that the airline has taken unilateral action, the union 
has essentially usurped the authority of the Mediation Board.  
The district court found that Congress intended that the 
Mediation Board have the power to keep the parties in 
mediation indefinitely.106  This granting of power was explicitly 
designed to force the parties to settle in order to prevent 
disruptions in air transportation.107 
Second, the district court found that if the bankruptcy 
court’s reasoning and conclusion were accepted, it would create 
a conflict between the RLA and § 1113 that would lead to 
inconsistent obligations.108  Most importantly, it would render § 
1113 a “suicide weapon” rather than a protective device.109  In 
other words, by imposing a penalty on a party for exercising its 
statutory and judicially approved right,110 the purposes of both 
  
 104 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 364-66. 
 105 Id.  Under the RLA, the Mediation Board has tremendous discretion to 
prolong the bargaining and negotiation process including the ability to induce 
arbitration, to order cooling-off periods, and to inform that President that a “labor 
emergency” exists.  See 45 U.S.C. § 160. 
 106 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 365 (“[a] ‘crucial aspect’ of 
the RLA is ‘the power given to the parties and the representative of the public to make 
the exhaustion of the Act’s remedies an almost interminable process’” (citing Detroit & 
Toledo, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969))); see also id. (“[T]he real ‘key’ is the Board’s authority 
to hold the parties to a dispute in mediation so they cannot engage in self-help; it is a 
‘coercive tool essential to bringing the parties to conciliation.’” (citing Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 930 F.2d 45, 47 
(D.C. Cir. 1991))). 
 107 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 365 (“The [Mediation Board]’s 
power to hold a dispute in mediation ‘is the key to the structure that Congress 
established for bringing about settlements without industrial strife’” (quoting Local 
808, Building Maint., Serv. & R.R. Workers v. Nat’l Mediation Board., 888 F.2d 1428, 
1432 (D.C. Cir. 1990))). 
 108 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 366-70. 
 109 Id. at 370. 
 110 Id. at 367 (“[I]n this case, Northwest acted lawfully, with express statutory 
and judicial authorization in altering the status quo pursuant to § 1113.”). 
2007] THE RUNWAY TO SETTLEMENT 1417 
the RLA and § 1113 would be defeated.111  In addition, 
permitting a strike following a § 1113 rejection would 
completely undermine the bankruptcy judge’s § 1113 findings: 
that rejection was “necessary” to the carrier’s reorganization, 
that the union did not have “good cause” to reject the carrier’s 
prior proposals leading up to the § 1113 motion, and that “the 
equities clearly favored rejection.”112   
Third, the district court concluded that the bankruptcy 
court’s reasoning “does not sufficiently take into account the 
fundamental policy concerns and purposes of the RLA.”113  
Consistent with this conclusion, the court rejected most of the 
bankruptcy court’s (and the union’s) reliance on National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) cases for the proposition that § 1113 
rejection triggered the right to strike.114  The court cautioned 
that cross-reliance between RLA and NLRA cases must be done 
with care because the statutes have two distinct policy 
purposes reflecting the industries that they govern.115  
Specifically, while “[t]he NLRA expressly protects the right to 
strike,”116 the RLA is designed with the express purpose of 
preventing strikes.117  Thus, any NLRA cases that stand for the 
proposition that § 1113 rejection implies a right to strike are 
  
 111 It would “undercut[] the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose of allowing a debtor to 
operate, provide services, and attract investments in favor of reorganization.”  Id. at 
368.  It would also ultimately “defeat the purpose of the RLA . . . , which is to avoid 
disruption of commerce by insuring that the carrier will continue operations pending 
resolution of labor disputes. . . .”  Id. at 368-69. 
 112 Id. at 370 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (2000)). 
 113 Id. at 364.  “The relationship of labor and management in the railroad [and 
airline] industr[ies] had developed on a pattern different from other industries.  The 
fundamental premises and principles of the [RLA] are not the same as those which 
form the basis of the [NLRA].”  Id. at 371 (quoting Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v. 
Chicago River and Indiana RR Co., 353 U.S. 30, 31 n.2 (1957) [hereinafter Chicago 
River]). 
 114 See, e.g., In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 374 (the court held 
that In re Petrusch, 14 B.R. 825 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), was “inapt” because it was a case 
involving an NLRA employer).  In Petrusch, the court held that, under the NLGA, it 
could not enjoin employee picket action targeted at the debtor-employer’s business.  Id.  
The Petrusch court based its refusal on the fact that the bankruptcy laws do not 
supercede the NLGA.  Id. 
 115 “[T]he RLA was passed first; yet rather than adding additional industries 
to the RLA’s framework, Congress created a separate statutory scheme for those 
industries, the NLRA, and expressly carved out employers and employees subject to 
the RLA from its coverage.”  Id. at 371 (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (2000)). 
 116 Id. at 371 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163) (2000)). 
 117 Id. at 372 (“[i]n the context of the railroad and airline industry . . . there is 
precisely such an anti-strike policy, embodied in the RLA” (citing Detroit & Toledo v. 
United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148, 154 (1969); Burlington R.R. v 
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 451 (1987))). 
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distinguishable and, at the very least, presumptively 
inapposite.118    
With respect to harmonizing the statutes, the district 
court noted that this case is primarily one of statutory 
construction.119  Therefore, it is relevant that both the RLA and 
§ 1113 are more specific than the NLGA.120  The Supreme Court 
held in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & 
Indiana Railroad Co121 that the specific provisions of the RLA 
take “trump” the NLGA.122  Consistent with that precedent, the 
district court concluded that to accommodate both statutes, the 
NLGA cannot operate to prohibit a court from enjoining 
compliance with the procedural requirements of the RLA.123  As 
a result, both parties have a legal obligation, enforceable by 
injunction, to comply with Sections 2 and 6 of the RLA.124  
For the reasons cited above,125 the district court 
concluded that § 1113 rejection does not automatically 
terminate Section 6 of the RLA bargaining process as the AFA 
argues.126  This is because if the union threatens to strike before 
the Mediation Board has declared an impasse, it would 
necessarily not be exerting “every reasonable effort” to reach a 
settlement under Section 2 of the RLA.127  While the court 
acknowledged that “reasonableness” under Section 2 is a 
  
 118 “The RLA’s fundamental concern with preventing disruption to the 
transportation industry by channeling all major disputes into a drawn-out bargaining 
and mediation process, distinguishes it from the NLRA and makes cases decided under 
the latter statute distinguishable.”  Id. at 373. 
 119 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 347. 
 120 The district court acknowledged two fundamental rules of statutory 
construction.  First, that specific provisions take precedence over general provisions.  
See id. at 374, 376.  Second, that a “statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific 
subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized 
spectrum . . . .”  Id. at 375 n.23 (quoting In re Petrusch, 14 B.R. 825, 829 (N.D.N.Y. 
1981)).  
 121 353 U.S. 30 (1957). 
 122 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 374-75 (referring to Chicago 
River, 353 U.S. at 42) (“[T]he specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take 
precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act.”). 
 123 Id. at 375 (“[I]n order to accommodate both [the NLGA and the RLA], the 
NLGA does not divest a court of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with the RLA’s 
specific mandates.”). 
 124 Id. at 376-77.  See Chicago & North Western, 402 U.S. at 577. 
 125 See supra notes 104, 108, 113 and accompanying text. 
 126 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 378. 
 127 Id. at 377.  Most importantly, the district court noted that “the [Mediation 
Board] is uniquely positioned to assess the new, lawfully authorized status quo that 
emerged from the operation of the § 1113 Order. . . .”  Id. at 379.  While the Mediation 
Board might very well declare that an impasse does exist post-§ 1113, it must be given 
the opportunity to assess the new situation.  Id. 
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flexible concept, what is “reasonable” must be considered in 
light of Congress’ policy goals in enacting § 1113.128  In this 
case, the court held that the threat to strike could hardly be 
considered reasonable, given that the bankruptcy court just 
concluded that the union had no “good cause” to reject the 
airline’s prior proposals.129  To reach the opposite conclusion 
and permit the union to strike without exerting every 
reasonable effort to reach a settlement would be contrary “to 
the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and to the 
Code’s overall effect to a give a [debtor] some flexibility and 
breathing space.”130   
Therefore, the district court reversed the bankruptcy 
court’s decision and remanded the case back to the bankruptcy 
court to determine whether, given the jurisdiction to enjoin a 
strike, the procedural and substantive requirements were met 
for an injunction in this case.131  In reaching this conclusion, the 
district court emphasized that after rejection, the airline (like 
the union) is still required to continue to negotiate with the 
union and attempt to reach a mutually agreeable settlement.132  
If, ultimately, an impasse remains post-rejection, and the 
Mediation Board has released the parties from mediation, only 
then does the union possess a right to strike in accordance with 
§ 1113 and the RLA.133  And only at that point will the NLGA 
prevent a federal court from enjoining the strike.134 
This decision’s consequences on the parties’ negotiations 
will be explored in the following two sections.  To establish a 
baseline, it is necessary to explore the nature of the bargaining 
relationship between the parties before the airline has chosen 
to reject a collective bargaining agreement. 
  
 128 Id. at 378.  “By the very existence of § 1113, Congress has given the 
rehabilitative goal of § 1113 precedence over labor law in order to permit rejection of 
collective bargaining agreements.” Id. at 381. 
 129 It is noteworthy that the union did not appeal the bankruptcy court’s 
decision to allow rejection.  Id. at 349. 
 130 Id. at 381 (citing Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984)). 
 131 Id. at 383-84.  A court may grant a preliminary injunction where the 
movant has demonstrated that “(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of 
success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make 
them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly 
toward the [moving party].”  Id. at 383 (citing Long Island R.R. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists, 874 F.2d 901, 910 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted)). 
 132 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 382.  
 133 Id. 
 134 Id.  
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3. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction 
issued by the district court.135  In doing so, the court reached 
three primary conclusions: 1) that the airline’s rejection under 
§ 1113 “abrogated (without breaching)” the existing CBA, 
which thereafter “ceased to exist;” 2) that the airline’s 
abrogation terminated the RLA status quo created by the prior 
CBA, after which the RLA’s status quo provisions “ceased to 
apply;” however, 3) at present, the AFA’s proposed strike would 
“violate the union’s independent duty under the RLA to ‘exert 
every reasonable effort to make . . . an agreement.’”136  
First, the court found that the rejection “abrogated the 
existing CBA in its entirety and replaced it with the March 1 
Agreement.”137  While this holding strictly conflicts with that of 
the district court—that the airline simply “replaced certain 
terms of the CBA with the more favorable terms of the March 1 
Agreement” (which otherwise stayed in force)—the effect is 
identical because the Second Circuit found, notwithstanding 
that abrogation, that the airline did not breach its 
agreement.138  Thus, the Second Circuit held that, pursuant to 
the bankruptcy court’s authority, the airline acted properly in 
abrogating the existing CBA in favor of new CBA terms 
necessary to its reorganization.139 
Second, the court found that the effect of the abrogation 
is that the RLA’s “explicit” status quo provisions no longer 
apply.140  By “explicit” provisions, the court is referring to the 
agreement-specific RLA requirements that govern the parties 
ability to change “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . 
  
 135 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-
4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488, at *12 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007).  The Second Circuit 
panel affirmed with Judges Walker and Raggi signing the majority opinion and Chief 
Judge Jacobs authoring a concurring opinion.  While Chief Judge Jacobs clearly agreed 
with the disposition of the case, the rationale he used to reach that conclusion more 
closely resembled that used by the district court.  See generally id. at *12-19. 
 136 Id. at *6. 
 137 Id.  The court found this to be true because “a carrier’s obligation to comply 
with [the] new terms [authorized by the bankruptcy court] cannot be reconciled with 
the continued existence of its prior contract.”  Id. 
 138 Id. at *6-7 (“If a carrier that rejected a CBA simultaneously breached that 
agreement and violated the RLA, the union would correspondingly be free to seek 
damages or strike, results inconsistent with Congress’ intent in passing §1113.”). 
 139 Id. at *8. 
 140 Id. at *9. 
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as embodied in agreements.”141  For example, pursuant to 45 
U.S.C. § 156, airlines and unions must give thirty days notice 
of any intended change to existing CBAs.142  Therefore, 
assuming that the airline and the union have not come to a 
mutual agreement on CBA terms following rejection, there is 
no agreement under § 152 and consequently, no status quo to 
maintain.143 
Third, the court held that notwithstanding the 
agreement-specific requirements described above, section 2 of 
the RLA also contains an independent duty to “exert every 
reasonable effort to ‘make’ agreements.”144  The court found 
that this duty—unlike the more specific duties described 
above—governs the parties’ conduct even after a CBA has been 
terminated or rejected.145   
In light of these conclusions, the Second Circuit held 
that the AFA had not yet discharged its duty to “exert every 
reasonable effort to make an agreement following rejection.”146  
Like the district court, the Second Circuit acknowledged that 
reasonableness is a flexible concept.147  As a guide, however, the 
court noted that the section 2 “reasonable effort” duty does 
impose unequal burdens on the airline and the union.148  
Specifically, the court held that absent bad faith on the part of 
the airline, “a union must come closer to exhausting the dispute 
resolution processes of the RLA than the AFA has in this case 
in order to satisfy its section 2 . . . duty.”149  In this case, the 
court noted three important considerations: 1) the bankruptcy 
court’s finding that rejection was “necessary;” 2) the airline’s 
continued eagerness to continue negotiations; and 3) that the 
Mediation Board had not declared an impasse.150  In light of 
those considerations, the court found that the AFA’s proposed 
  
 141 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 2007 WL 926488, at *9 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 
152 (2000)). 
 142 Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 156 (2000)). 
 143 Id. at *8 (“The RLA does not contemplate the inauguration of a new status 
quo absent the mutual agreement of labor and management.”). 
 144 Id. at *10 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at *11-12. 
 147 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 2007 WL 926488, at *10; see supra text 
accompanying note 128. 
 148 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 2007 WL 926488, at *10. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at *11  The court noted that the AFA has not yet sought the assistance 
of the Mediation Board; however, it declined to comment on whether the district court 
may enjoin the parties to return to the Mediation Board.  Id. at *11 n.8. 
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strike was not justified because it had not made “every 
reasonable effort to reach an agreement.”151   
III. THE PRE-REJECTION SITUATION 
In order to understand the implications of the 
Northwest Airlines case, it is necessary to understand the pre-
rejection situation.  This Note argues that the pre-rejection 
situation is a desirable status quo where both the airline and 
union are able to derive some benefits.  Specifically, while the 
airline typically possesses enough leverage to extract the 
necessary financial concessions from its labor unions, the union 
also is able to extract “non-financial” benefits in return for 
making those company-saving concessions.  This Note suggests 
that this type of reciprocity is possible in the pre-rejection 
situation because certain elements of the bankruptcy process 
and the RLA afford the union a modicum of bargaining 
leverage.  Given the circumstances of the airline’s bankruptcy, 
the benefits that the union receives are both justifiable and 
potentially productive.  Therefore, this Note suggests that 
courts must preserve that pre-rejection bargaining 
relationship, and resulting status quo, through a proper 
application of the governing statutes. 
A. Leverage in Airline Bankruptcies 
“Leverage” plays a distinct and important role in CBA-
type cases such as Northwest Airlines.  The amount of leverage 
that a party possesses is determinative of that party’s ability to 
make demands or force the other party to make concessions.152 
When one party possesses leverage, it is in a position to extract 
concessions from its adversary or insist on favorable 
amendments to an existing CBA.153  A party to a labor dispute 
can gain leverage in one of two ways: 1) when one party gains a 
new ability to pressure the other party into accepting 
concessions; 2) or when one party loses an ability to resist 
pressures or is somehow prohibited from exercising an 
advantage it may have otherwise enjoyed.  The next three 
  
 151 Id. at *11.   
 152 See Scott R. Rosner, The History and Business of Contraction in Major 
League Baseball, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 265, 280 (2003). 
 153 See David L. Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection 
Against Employer Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77, 
87 (1987). 
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subsections explore the factors and mechanisms in an airline 
bankruptcy that may allow either the airline or the union to 
gain leverage and consequently force the other party to make 
concessions.  
1. The Market for Airline Labor 
Historically, market forces have greatly influenced the 
apportionment of leverage between a labor union and airline 
management.  For example, after deregulation154 in 1978, a 
number of new airlines entered the industry and price 
competition became fierce.155  At the same time, the price of 
aircraft fuel increased three-fold.156  Both low-cost competition 
and high fuel prices persist in today’s airline market.157  As a 
result of these factors, which are out of the airlines’ control,158 
  
 154 Prior to 1978, the airline industry was highly regulated.  In a recent article 
on airline bankruptcies, one commentator described the effects of deregulation:   
Prior to deregulation, the government largely controlled fares, routes, and 
other aspects of the airline industry.  During that time, if operating costs 
increased—due to higher fuel costs, or more expensive labor contracts—
prices, in most instances, were correspondingly raised.  Routes were not 
added without a demonstrated need for new services.  With competition 
effectively in check, the pre-deregulation era was described as a “fairly 
comfortable operating environment.”  Airline bankruptcies prior to 1978 were 
“extremely rare.” 
Despite the relative certainty of the status quo, airline deregulation was 
enacted with an eye toward restoring competition in the industry. Lowering 
the barriers to entry would mean more airlines in the marketplace to 
challenge existing carriers.  Service would be brought to smaller, previously 
underserved areas.  Carriers could set their own rates, with more efficient 
operators gaining ground on lesser competitors.  Consumers would also enjoy 
lower prices.  Deregulation, it was argued, would restore industry profits to 
the benefit of all.  
Eva M. Dowdell, The Chapter 11 “Shuttle”—Coincidence or Competitive Strategy, 71 J. 
AIR LAW & COMM. 669, 671 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 155 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway 
Labor Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1989).  The new 
entrants to the market were typically non-union operations.  As a result, their labor 
costs were considerably lower than their legacy counterparts.  In addition, non-union 
carriers were not laden with heavy debt burdens, and “were able to take advantage of 
their lower costs to underbid the major unionized carriers for customers.  [As a result,] 
the unionized carriers were forced to match the discounted fares.”  Id.  
 156 Id. at 1489-90. 
 157 See supra Part I. 
 158 New technology is making it possible for the airlines to combat the 
exponentially rising cost of fuel and regain some “control” over their operating costs.   
Some airlines are installing new aviation software that “redraw[s] the routes planes fly 
to get from point A to point B—and saving airlines millions of dollars.”  Carey, supra 
note 22.  This sophisticated new software helps airlines “find the best balance of fuel 
usage, flight speed and flight path.”  Id.  Specifically, the software is designed to 
sometimes direct the planes to fly more circuitous international routes in order to avoid 
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the management of the legacy carriers are forced to “go to war” 
against their unions and seek substantial concessions in wages 
and work rules.159 
At first glance this proposition seems counterintuitive: if 
the airlines are the ones in the financial “pinch,” shouldn’t the 
unions be able to exploit that weakness and force the airlines 
themselves to make the concessions?  One commentator 
addresses this anomaly and argues that the reverse is in fact 
true: “airline employees are particularly vulnerable to the 
financial difficulties of their employers due to the fact that 
historically they have been organized on a company-wide craft 
basis rather than on an industrial basis.”160  Therefore, because 
the seniority system is airline specific (i.e., there is no industry-
wide seniority), employees do not have the option of leaving one 
airline and “transferring” their seniority to another.161  As a 
result, the employees have an incentive to make concessions 
because they have a direct stake in the financial health of their 
employer.  In other words, because the employees’ future is 
contingent on the airline’s solvency, the nature of employee 
seniority gives an airline significant leverage to extract 
concessions from its labor unions.   
The primary concessions that an airline will seek are 
decreases in wages, increases in work hours and significant 
reductions in pension and retirement benefits.162  While it is 
indisputable that these financial concessions are disastrous for 
the employees who rely on wages to make a living, the union is 
not powerless to extract non-financial benefits in return.  As 
will be discussed below, the bankruptcy process and the RLA 
do give the union sufficient leverage to acquire these benefits.  
2. Creditor Committee Participation 
By virtue of the labor union’s participation on 
bankruptcy creditor committees, the airline is forced to alter its 
  
overflying countries who charge what the airline deems to be excessive overflight, or 
air usage fees.  See id.  The software then determines whether overflight savings 
offsets the cost of flying more miles.  Id. 
 159 Stone, supra note 155, at 1490.  The airlines “used the threat of 
bankruptcy, merger or sale in negotiations to procure concessions.  When negotiations 
failed, they demonstrated that they were willing to operate during strikes and to hire 
permanent replacements to take strikers’ jobs.”  Id. at 1491-92. 
 160 Id. at 1490-91. 
 161 Id. at 1491. 
 162 See Jeff Bailey & Nick Bunkley, Northwest and Its Flight Attendants Await 
a Strike Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at C3; see also Delta Adds $719 Million to 
Claims of Retired Pilots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at C4. 
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behavior in a way that provides the union with distinct 
benefits.  Before analyzing these benefits, it is important to 
understand the vital role that creditor committees play in the 
administration of a Chapter 11 reorganization.163  The creditor 
committee’s most important role is to oversee the debtor’s 
current operations and reorganization plan.164  An important 
part of that power is that the creditors, through the creditors’ 
committee, are given the opportunity to be heard in court when 
they feel that their interests might be adversely affected by the 
debtor’s actions.165  The result is that every move that a debtor 
makes when in Chapter 11 is “subject to bankruptcy court 
oversight.”166  In addition, the creditors can also work to 
preserve their interests in out-of-court “work-outs” through 
direct bargaining between the creditor committees and the 
debtor.167 
It is only recently, however, that labor unions have been 
permitted to participate on “general” creditor committees.168  In 
  
 163 The Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of creditors’ 
committees.  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).  Committees traditionally consist of 
the seven largest trade creditors, bondholders, and indenture trustees, with more than 
one committee appointed in certain circumstances.  See 11 U.S.C §§ 1102-03 (2000).  
The committee’s role is generally to consult and meet with the carrier, monitor and 
investigate management, and negotiate a reorganization plan.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 
(2000); see also Richard M. Seltzer, The Changed Role of Unions in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcies, 18 AIR & SPACE LAW. 8 (2003). 
 164 “Creditor and equity committees can investigate the debtors’ past and 
current operations, oversee continuing operations, and negotiate with the debtor 
concerning a reorganization plan.”  In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338, 369 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 
926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007). 
 165 See id. at 370; see also In re Western Pacific Airlines, Inc., 219 B.R. 575, 
577-78 (D. Colo. 1998) (describing the creditors’ committee role as a “watchdog” 
function). 
 166 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 370.  In support, the court cited 
the following statutes: 
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C § 363(b) (1984) (transactions outside ordinary course of 
business require notice and a hearing); 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1984) (court 
approval required before assuming or rejecting any executory contract or 
unexpired lease of real property); 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(b)-(d) (1984) (permission 
required before obtaining certain credit or debt other than in the ordinary 
course of business or on a secured or superpriority basis). 
Id. at 370. 
 167 An argument can be made that most of the “real work” in a bankruptcy 
takes place out of court.  See Seltzer, supra note 163, at 9. 
 168 In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that labor unions 
have a right to participate on general, unsecured creditor committees.  In re Altar 
Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984).  The court reasoned that because a union, as 
a “collective bargaining representative has a ‘right to payment’ of unpaid wages within 
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the first Continental Airlines bankruptcy in 1983 and in the 
Eastern Airlines bankruptcy of 1989, the labor unions were 
relegated to subcommittees and were prohibited from 
participating on the general commercial creditors’ committee.169  
In the Eastern Airlines case, the general creditors’ committee, 
which did not include labor union representatives, chose to 
“defer to management’s labor and strategic policies” 
immediately after filing for bankruptcy.170  One commentator 
argues that in allowing this exclusion, the bankruptcy courts 
effectively “sidelined” the labor voice in bankruptcy 
reorganization.171  Today, with inclusion as the general rule,172 
unions now sit on creditors’ committees as experienced and 
well-respected members of the reorganization process.173   
By virtue of that participation, the union now possesses 
unprecedented bargaining leverage.  Specifically, participation 
on creditor committees allows the union to be involved in every 
facet of the reorganization process—not merely the labor 
issues.174  The effect of this is that the airline is forced to deal 
with repeat players at every step of the game.175  For example, 
the airline must exercise caution in forcing the union to make 
unreasonable labor concessions because any unreasonableness 
might carry over and be held against the airline when it is 
seeking concessions from a creditor over which it does not have 
  
the meaning of [the Bankruptcy Code],” the union should have an equal role in the 
reorganization process.  Id. at 91. 
 169 Seltzer, supra note 163, at 8. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id.  See In re Ionosphere Corp., 113 B.R. 164, 166-67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (while the Air Line Pilot’s Association union moved for the appointment of a 
trustee a few days after the filing of the case, and while the court found repeated 
instances of the airline’s pre-petition misconduct that would ordinarily justify the 
appointment of a trustee, the court chose not to appoint a trustee until 13 months after 
the filing date when the motion was made by the general creditors’ committee). 
 172 The Air Line Pilots Association International (a labor union) was 
appointed as the chairman of the creditors’ committees recently in the US Airways and 
United Airlines bankruptcies.  Seltzer, supra note 163, at 9. 
 173 Id.  “Unions are able to share strategic views, including views on 
management or business plans, with other constituencies and forge joint positions 
within an organized creditor structure that simply does not exist outside of 
bankruptcy.”  Id. 
 174 In 2006, even if Delta Air Line’s management concluded that a merger 
with U.S. Airways was the best strategy for reorganization, that action could not be 
taken without the consent of the creditors’ committee.  See Michael J. de la Merced, US 
Airways Expected to Present Merger Offer for Delta This Week, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2006, at C7. 
 175 See Seltzer, supra note 163, at 9.  
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a leverage advantage.176  In effect, every aspect of the 
reorganization process is subject to greater scrutiny and 
broader consequences. 
This increased scrutiny allows the union to exert 
pressure on the airline to make concessions it might not have 
to make outside of bankruptcy.  One area where this is 
particularly felt is in the management of the bankruptcy 
estate.177  For example, in In re Ionosphere Corp.,178 the 
creditors’ committee threatened, with the court’s implicit 
permission, not to support the airline’s further use of escrowed 
funds for operating expenses if the airline did not immediately 
agree to have a trustee replace the airline’s management.179  
Because the creditor committee’s support was so essential to 
obtaining that much-needed cash for basic operating expenses, 
the airline’s ability to resist the committee’s ultimatum was 
compromised.180 
The ability to force management to step down181 has the 
potential to give the labor union two distinct benefits.  First, by 
forcing the current management to step down and substitute a 
  
 176 Id. at 9 (“Today, when a carrier’s management enters the meeting room of 
a creditors’ committee to seek support for a strategic move, they must face the 
representatives of the carrier’s employees, who are present as respected, often key, 
decision makers for the creditors’ committee.”). 
 177 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000) (The “bankruptcy estate” is composed of “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case”).  In Chapter 11, management of the bankruptcy estate includes continuing to 
run the debtor’s business. 
 178 In re Ionosphere Corp. is the name of the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy case.  
Because Eastern Airlines wanted to file its petition in the Southern District of New 
York (“S.D.N.Y.”), it caused one of its affiliates, Ionosphere Corporation, which 
operated the airport lounges and was domiciled in the S.D.N.Y., to file a bankruptcy 
petition in the S.D.N.Y.  Then, Eastern Airlines was permitted to file in the S.D.N.Y. 
even though it was a “foreign” venue.  This type of forum shopping is permitted under 
the Code through the “affiliate venue” doctrine.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2000) (“a case 
under title 11 may be commenced in the district court for the district . . . in which there 
is pending a case under title 11 concerning such person’s affiliate, general partner, or 
partnership”). 
 179 See In re Ionosphere Corp., 113 B.R. 164, 171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 180 This results in a reduction of bargaining leverage.  See supra Part III.A.; 
see also MICHAEL A. GERBER, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 257-58 (2d ed. 2000). 
 181 See GERBER, supra note 180, at 257-58. 
In cases involving larger companies particularly, management is prone to 
change on the eve of bankruptcy or soon afterwards.  Professors Lopucki and 
Whitford demonstrated this in a study that they conducted of 43 large, 
publicly held companies that had sought relief in Chapter 11.  They found 
that in the period beginning eighteen months before filing and ending six 
months after confirmation, 91% of the companies experienced a change in 
CEO. 
Id. 
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trustee, it is less likely that the prior management’s poor 
business judgments will continue.182  In effect, the union, 
through the creditor committee, now possesses the ability to 
indirectly influence management decisions.183  Second, forcing 
management to step down allows the union to resume RLA 
bargaining with the trustee, who is more likely to be neutral 
than the airline’s management.184  Thus, the ability to force this 
type of concession from the airline demonstrates the 
tremendous influence the union now has by virtue of its 
participation on these committees. 
In sum, the net result of this multilateral involvement is 
an increase in good faith and reasonableness on the part of the 
airline.  While the relationship between the airline as the 
debtor and the union as a creditor remains adversarial in many 
respects, increased union participation fosters an environment 
where compromise is more likely.  As will be discussed below, 
were the union to gain a surplus of leverage—by acquiring the 
right to strike—the compromise-inducing features of this 
relationship would be destroyed as the airline would be at the 
mercy of the union. 
3. The RLA in the Bankruptcy Context 
When the “status-quo provisions” of the RLA operate in 
conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code, the union possesses 
significant bargaining leverage over the airline.  The status-
quo provisions of the RLA are roughly analogous to the 
automatic stay in the Bankruptcy Code.185  This is because both 
provisions have the effect of giving the debtor “breathing space” 
to sort out its obligations and concentrate on a reorganization 
plan.186  Under Section 6 of the RLA, “the parties must bargain 
  
 182 See infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 183 See Cooke v. U.S., 796 F. Supp. 1298, 1300-01 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (debtor-
airline acquiesced to creditors’ committee recommendation that the current CEO be 
replaced by an experienced party who had been hired part-time “to assist the faltering 
airline with interline agreements and to encourage lenders and investors to put 
additional capital into [the airline]”). 
 184 See In re New Orleans Paddlewheels, Inc., 350 B.R. 667  (Bankr. E.D. La. 
2006) (“With a trustee, all interests are assured a neutral party with the best interests 
of the creditors at heart.”).  
 185 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)-(g) (2000) (the automatic stay prohibits 
any attempt by a creditor to collect a debt or improve his position without the express 
authority of the bankruptcy court). 
 186 See In re Timbers of Inwood Associates, Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 367 n.7 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (describing the automatic stay as “breathing space” (citing In re American 
Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1984))). 
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in good faith over the proposed modifications”187 and neither 
party is permitted to alter the status quo by unilaterally 
changing the existing CBA.188  While in bankruptcy, this 
prohibition on unilateral changes is critical because it prohibits 
the union from taking any action that would harm the airline’s 
current operations.189  Only when a resolution is reached, or 
when the Mediation Board has declared an impasse and a 
conclusion of the Section 6 bargaining procedures, may the 
status quo be disturbed.190  Therefore, like the automatic stay, 
the status quo provisions “freeze” any attempt by either party 
to force or reach a solution in any manner other than what is 
explicitly provided by the RLA.191 
At first glance, this appears to give the airline a 
leverage advantage.  Because the union is prohibited from 
striking, it is forced to sit down with airline management and 
bargain according to prescribed procedures.  While this 
argument may hold outside of bankruptcy, it fails to appreciate 
the nature of this “forced” bargaining in bankruptcy.  In 
bankruptcy, forced bargaining reduces the union’s leverage 
over the airline because, unlike a NLRA-governed dispute, the 
union is expressly prohibited from applying “immediate 
economic pressure” to force the employer to acquiesce to its 
demands.192  Thus, while the parties are required to bargain, 
they are not required to abide by any specified time 
limitations.193   
When operating in bankruptcy, time is an airline’s 
greatest enemy.194  The reality of the airline business is that 
most major airlines are operating at a loss, and employment 
costs are a large reason for their insolvency.195  Because the 
  
 187 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333, 340 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d 
by, 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-
cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007). 
 188 See Tulk, supra note 14, at 618-19. 
 189 See id. at 618-19. 
 190 See id. at 619. 
 191 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.   
 192 See Reinert, supra note 49, at 4. 
 193 The RLA does not set a maximum time for bargaining.  See supra note 106. 
 194 See Stone, supra note 155, at 1499. 
 195 For the fiscal year 2005, the average operating loss for the six legacy 
carriers was approximately $513M.   See Annual Reports and SEC 10-K Filings for 
American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, US Airways, Continental Airlines 
and Northwest Airlines, available at http://www.aa.com, http://www.continental.com, 
http://www.nwa.com, http://www.united.com, http://www.delta.com and 
http://www.usairways.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). 
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airline has no control over the cost of fuel or passenger 
demand, the airlines will seek financial give-backs and 
concessions from its creditors and unions as the quickest way 
to relieve themselves of burdensome obligations and return to 
profitability.196  It is the airline’s immediate need for labor 
concessions that gives the union leverage.197  This is because 
the “immediate need” is antithetical to the RLA status quo 
provisions.  While the airline requires quick concessions, the 
status quo provisions allow the union to “hold-out” under the 
guise of “continued bargaining,” “good faith consideration,” or 
“consultation with membership.”198  Other than making a 
motion for immediate rejection under § 1113, the airline is 
virtually powerless to expedite this process.   
Fortunately, this system has a self-checking feature.  
That feature is that the union is not foolhardy—it appreciates 
the potential consequences for its members if the airline should 
fall deeper into debt.199  Therefore, the union is not likely to use 
the interminable nature of the status quo to categorically 
refuse concessions—it will merely defer acceptance of those 
concessions and “hold-out” in order to gain concessions of its 
own.  Due to the airline’s financial situation, the union 
understands that these concessions will likely not come in the 
form of financial benefits.  However, financial benefits are only 
a part of the union’s modus operandi, for unions use CBAs to 
provide their employees with less-tangible, “cost-neutral” 
benefits.200   
  
 196 See Stone, supra note 155, at 1499. 
 197 Id. (“With time and the pressure of the status quo on their side, unions 
have often negotiated for outcomes that altered the employer’s initial decision or 
cushioned its impact on their members.”). 
 198 Id. (The RLA’s status quo requirement “enables unions to discuss 
[management] decisions before they are implemented and to prevent unilateral 
employer actions in the interim.”). 
 199 It is important to remember that the unions must balance the benefits that 
its constituents might receive from holding out with the injury that would occur to its 
constituents’ careers if extended periods of onerous obligations forced the airline into 
liquidation.  For example, in 2003 American Airlines was on the verge of bankruptcy 
and its parent corporation authorized a bankruptcy filing.  It was “only the unions’ 
agreement to $1.6 in concessions that kept the airline solvent and [out of bankruptcy].  
These concessions were undoubtedly more attractive to the labor unions than the 
possible aftermath of the airline declaring bankruptcy.”  Tulk, supra note 14, at 634.  
Perhaps the reason for this fear was because the unions knew that while in 
bankruptcy, the airline would have the option of rejection under § 1113 and they would 
have no “good cause” to oppose that request. 
 200 See Berman, supra note 34, at 985-86; see also Telephone Interview with 
Karen Mazure, Member, AFA Financial Review Committee for United Airlines Flight 
Attendants (Nov. 4, 2006) [hereinafter AFA Interview]. 
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These “cost-neutral” benefits run the gamut of 
tangibility.  On one end, the union can use the threat of 
“holding-out” as a means to affect “strategic level corporate 
decisions.”201  In addition, unions actively seek greater 
participation in management decisions as means of improving 
their members’ prestige and endowing them with a voice in 
shaping the future of the company.202   For example, in the 
Northwest Airlines case, the flight attendants were successful 
in altering the airline’s future hiring plan, which the flights 
attendants perceived as troublesome to their job security.203  
Furthermore, in exchange for reductions in wages or increases 
in work hours, the unions can bargain for representation on the 
airline’s board of directors.204    Other options are more financial 
in nature and are contingent on the future success of the 
company.  These options include: bargaining for a plan of 
employee ownership, profit-sharing programs, stock options, 
and “greater employee involvement in financial planning.”205  In 
the Northwest Airlines case, the plan of reorganization being 
proposed by Northwest’s management provides that employees 
“will own about 20 percent of the airlines through profit 
sharing and claims granted in exchange for concessions.”206  In 
  
 201 See Stone, supra note 155, at 1499; see also supra note 183 and 
accompanying text. 
 202 In the United Airlines bankruptcy, in exchange for financial concessions, 
the flight attendants were able to negotiate and receive “quality-of-life” concessions.  
First, they renegotiated the disciplinary policy for employees who were tardy to work in 
“no-fault” situations.  Second, they rebuffed an attempt by airline management to 
remove the stripes from their uniforms, which the flight attendants perceived as an 
attempt to degrade the image of the flight attendants vis-à-vis the rest of the flight 
crew.  AFA Interview, supra note 200. 
 203 In an earlier proceeding, the flight attendants convinced the management 
to drop its proposal to hire foreign flights attendants for some of its trans-pacific 
routes.  See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 328 n.25.  The court found that 
this concession showed considerable “flexibility in the allocation of concessions,” 
especially since the hiring of these foreign workers would have made “good business 
sense.”  Id. at 327.  The record showed that “[t]he hiring of foreign flight attendants 
would not only reduce costs, but it would also allow the [airline] to attract and serve 
customers in a segment of their business in which they compete with foreign airlines 
that appear to offer better language capabilities.”  Id. 
 204 See Stone, supra note 155, at 1491.   
 205 Id. 
 206 Northwest Expects To Be Worth $7 Billion After Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 2007, at C7.  This proposal is promising considering that in typical bankruptcy 
reorganizations, equity holders at the time the company entered bankruptcy often 
“lose” their ownership interest when the company emerges from bankruptcy.  (Airline 
employees often own stock in their employer.)   Because equity holders enjoy the lowest 
priority of those who must be “paid out” as part of a reorganization plan, equity holders 
are often stripped of their ownership interests so that creditors, who have a higher 
priority, can be compensated as required by bankruptcy law.  When the company 
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the recent United Airlines bankruptcy, the flight attendants 
bargained for convertible notes and company contributions to 
401K retirement plans in exchange for the airline terminating 
their pensions.207  The Northwest and United cases 
demonstrate the immediacy with which the airlines need to 
save money.  In those cases, the airlines are willing to confer 
significant future financial benefits in order to reduce their 
short-term obligations.208 
This type of quid pro quo that affords the union greater 
participation in the reorganization process is similar to the 
negotiations occurring through the union’s participation on 
creditor committees.209  Airline management should view this 
type of reciprocal bargaining with open eyes because an 
agreement to share control and involve unions in long-range 
planning is hardly a price to pay for concessions that reduce 
the airline’s most burdensome obligation.  Therefore, the courts 
should seek to perpetuate an environment where these 
reciprocal concessions are possible.   
B. The Pre-Rejection Situation as Good Public Policy 
While the airline may ultimately be able to earn 
financial concessions on its labor-related CBAs, labor unions do 
possess enough bargaining leverage in the pre-rejection 
situation to extract substantial concessions for their 
members.210  As a matter of bankruptcy and labor policy, these 
benefits are justified and will tend to facilitate a more efficient 
and equitable reorganization.  Specifically, the leverage 
apportionment between the union and the airline prior to 
rejection establishes a manageable and potentially productive 
status quo in two distinct ways.  
  
emerges from bankruptcy, creditors are often compensated by exchanging their debt 
claims for newly issued equity (stock) in the company, which effectively eliminates the 
previous equity holders’ interests.   
 207 AFA Interview, supra note 200.  The bankruptcy court in the United 
Airlines case found that termination of the pensions was necessary in order to keep the 
airline functioning.  United was released from $3.2 billion in pension obligations 
through 2010.  In response, “[t]he federal agency that guarantees pensions, the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, . . . assume[d] responsibility for the plans, which cover 
about 134,000 people.”  Micheline Maynard, United Air Wins Right to Default on its 
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at A1. 
 208 It is noteworthy that the airline reneged on offers to provide supplemental 
insurance and “early-out” terminations—both of these concessions would have required 
the airline to sacrifice capital in the short term.  AFA Interview, supra note 200.  
 209 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 210 See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text. 
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First, while the airline is entitled to certain protections 
designed to give a debtor a “fresh start,”211 it is well established 
that these protections should not come at the complete expense 
of the creditors.212  In other words, it is both expected and 
typical for the debtor to have to make significant sacrifices in 
exchange for the protective features of the bankruptcy code—
particularly § 1113.213  The debtor’s sacrifices can be considered 
fair consideration for the opportunity for a second chance.214  In 
addition, to put labor disputes in perspective, the reduction of 
labor costs is only one of the many important pieces in the 
bankruptcy puzzle.215  Neither party (including the court) can 
afford to have the labor component of the bankruptcy swallow 
up other important considerations or hinder the overall 
reorganization process.216 In this way, any internal mechanism, 
such as greater union participation, that quickens the 
  
 211 See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 123 (Aspen 2006) (By 
distinguishing between pre- and post-bankruptcy petition debts, the debtors receive the 
first benefit of the fresh start—the “opportunity to put misfortune or irresponsibility 
behind them and to begin life anew.”). 
 212 See Christo v. Yellin, 228 B.R. 48, 53 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999). 
If viewed as a balancing of competing interests, bankruptcy laws should serve 
both the need of the debtor for economic rehabilitation by debt forgiveness 
and a fresh start, . . . [and] the interests of creditors and society that the 
absolved debts be free of fraud, and that the debtor’s assets in excess of 
exemptible amounts be distributed to the creditors.   
Id. (citing Hon. William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of 
Exemption Limitations: The ‘Opt-Out’ as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 152 (1997) (citation omitted)). 
 213 These protections include, but are not limited to: the power to reject a 
collective bargaining agreement, 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000); the power to reject executory 
contracts and unexpired leases, 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000); the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362 (2000); the trustee’s power to avoid unperfected security interests in personal and 
real property, 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000); and the trustee’s power to rescind harmful 
transactions occurring shortly before filing the bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C. § 547 
(2000). 
 214 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (explaining that the 
“fresh start” has limits and that even “the honest but unfortunate debtor” may not 
have the opportunity for a completely “unencumbered new beginning”). 
 215 In airline bankruptcies, while labor is an important component of the 
restructuring process, the airline must negotiate with other important constituencies to 
reduce its operating costs and current obligations.  See Northwest Airlines, Current 
News Releases, Northwest Airlines Files its Plan of Reorganization (Jan. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.nwa.com/corpinfo/newsc/2007/pr020820071739.html (describing 
new agreements with airports (terminal and hanger leases), partner airlines, aircraft 
manufacturers, and banks).   
 216 See Richard L. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, 19 J. MARHSALL L. REV. 301, 356 (1986) (“[T]he purpose of bankruptcy 
reorganization is debt adjustment and maximizing the equitable distribution of 
available assets and future earnings among creditors.”). 
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resolution of labor disputes is productive for the overall 
bankruptcy restructuring process.  The less time that the 
parties spend in adversarial legal proceedings or on opposite 
sides of the bargaining table, the less likely it is that any 
animus will carry over and affect other aspects of the 
reorganization.217  
Second, when a debtor seeks bankruptcy protection, it is 
an indication that the debtor requires assistance.  While 
market forces may have contributed to the debtor’s insolvency, 
it should be assumed the debtor is somewhat responsible for its 
financial distress.  In fact, the courts recognize a presumption 
that the debtor, prior to declaring bankruptcy, made at least 
some unwise business decisions leading up to its bankruptcy 
filing.218  Therefore, the incorporation of experienced parties 
such as the labor unions into the management structure should 
be looked upon favorably.219   In addition, by granting the 
employees a stake in the future of the company, it gives the 
employees an incentive to provide better customer service.  
Increased customer satisfaction is critical to putting the airline 
on the right track toward profitability, particularly in the 
airline industry where reputation can have a significant effect 
on demand for an airline’s services.220 
The fate of this desirable status quo is contingent upon 
other courts’ following the lead of the district court and Second 
Circuit in the Northwest Airlines case.   The next section will 
demonstrate how the district court’s decision establishes a 
framework for the preservation of that leverage apportionment 
and pre-rejection status quo notwithstanding an airline’s 
request for emergency relief under § 1113. 
  
 217 This concern is particularly acute because the general creditors committees 
are involved in every aspect of the reorganization.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 218 See In re Ionosphere Corp., 113 B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The 
language of § 1104(a)(1) of the Code represents Congressional recognition that some 
degree of mismanagement exists in virtually every insolvency case.”). 
 219 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really Necessary?, 
10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 107, 112-13 (2000) (“The Court discussed that despite the 
capital intensive nature of the railroad industry and, to a lesser extent, the airline 
industry, retention of skills, organization and reputation for performance must be 
considered valuable assets contributing to going concern value in aiding rehabilitation 
where that is possible.” (citing In re Gulf Air, Inc., 112 B.R. 152, 153-54 
(Bankr.W.D.La. 1989))). 
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IV. THE POST-REJECTION SITUATION 
In the Northwest Airlines case, the rejection of the CBA 
under § 1113 had the potential to destroy the pre-rejection 
status quo if the union were permitted to take immediate 
strike action.  If other courts do not follow the lead established 
by the Second Circuit, and alternatively apply the rationale of 
the bankruptcy court, the airlines will suddenly be at the 
mercy of their employees, for they simply cannot afford to halt 
their operations for days, or even weeks.221  On a broader scale, 
if the bankruptcy court’s harmonization of the statutes prevails 
in other courts nationwide and unions are permitted to strike 
immediately after rejection, the status quo will be instantly 
altered as the union comes into possession of its strike weapon.  
The result will be a reduction of the bilateral concessions and 
compromises that make that status quo a productive one.222   
This Note suggests that even though the objectives of 
both parties might continue to be in conflict following rejection, 
the framework established in the Second Circuit increases the 
likelihood that the pre-rejection status quo will be maintained 
after rejection.  To go one step further and ensure its 
maintenance, this Note argues that courts and the Mediation 
Board must insist on holding unions—both the AFA in 
Northwest Airlines and unions in the future—to the “good faith 
obligations” explicitly found in both the Bankruptcy Code and 
the RLA. 
A. After Rejection, What’s Next? 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Northwest Airlines 
requires the parties to return to the RLA-Section 6 bargaining 
table.223  Not only must they return, but, pursuant to Section 2 
  
 221 When the bankruptcy court granted Northwest’s motion for § 1113 relief, it 
found that a strike would have disastrous consequences on the airline, its employees 
and its creditors.  See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 329 (“[T]he Court has 
already found that revisions to the PFAA agreement and the Debtors’ other collective 
bargaining agreements are ‘necessary’ to prevent liquidation and preserve value. The 
Debtors cannot survive under the present agreements, and liquidation of this service 
company would likely cost all employees (including the flight attendants) their jobs and 
result in little or no recovery to creditors.”). 
 222 See e.g., Seltzer supra note 163, at 8 (Through participation on general 
creditor committees, “[l]abor unions are now . . . viewed and treated by debtors, 
committees, creditors, the courts, and the media as full bankruptcy ‘players,’ and that 
shift has been an improvement for the bankruptcy reorganization process.”). 
 223 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  This proposition assumes that 
on remand, the bankruptcy court found that the standard was met for a preliminary 
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of the RLA, they must also continue to make “every reasonable 
effort” to reach a settlement that is mutually agreeable.224  It is 
unrealistic, however, to assume that both parties will return to 
the bargaining table in the same place as where they started—
that is to say equally eager to work toward a solution.   
For a number of reasons, the union is not likely to be 
amenable to further negotiations after the terms it had 
originally bargained for and expected were substituted at the 
request of the airline.225  First, it is clear after numerous 
adversarial legal proceedings that bargaining is insufficient 
and that the debtor has no more options.  Specifically, by 
asking the court for permission to reject a CBA after a failed 
bargaining process, the airline has signaled to the court and 
the public that the union is unwilling to compromise and that it 
has no choice but to invoke to § 1113 as a last resort.226  Second, 
the union is faced with the fact that it has been established on 
the record that the union has refused to agree to “necessary” 
modifications without any “good cause.”227  Therefore, from the 
perspective of the public, the Mediation Board, and any 
potential arbitrator, there is a presumption of the union’s bad 
faith.228  Third, because the union was not willing to make 
sufficient concessions in its wages or benefits, it is unlikely that 
it now enjoys any of the “new” management responsibilities 
that could have resulted from pre-rejection compromises.229  In 
other words, the union representatives are likely to feel even 
more alienated from the airline’s management than before. 
Despite the union’s probable distaste for future 
bargaining, the Second Circuit in Northwest Airlines has made 
it clear that the union has a continued obligation to do so.230  
Therefore, from the union’s perspective, the best that it could 
  
injunction and the union was consequently enjoined from strike activity.  See supra 
note 131 and accompanying text. 
 224 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 225 “Collective bargaining agreements . . . and other policies regarding 
workplace relations exist in part to clarify the rights and responsibilities of workers 
and management and to assure a certain equality of treatment and expectations.”  
Peter Robinson, et al., DyADS: Encouraging “Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems” in 
the Organized Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 339, 361 (2005).  This expectancy is 
necessarily upset when one party (with the court’s permission) imposes un-bargained 
for terms on the other party. 
 226 See Matter of Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 973 n.15 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987). 
 227 See supra note 66. 
 228 This presumption will be applied in Part IV.D infra. 
 229 See supra notes 202-05. 
 230 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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hope for is that the resumption of negotiations is a short-lived 
formality.  Specifically, the union would likely prefer that the 
Mediation Board quickly declare an “impasse”—then, after 
declining an invitation to enter arbitration,231 the union’s power 
to strike would no longer be deferred.232  Because the union 
would finally possess its long-anticipated economic weapon, it 
would then have the power to force the airline to accept its 
terms under duress.233  If the Mediation Board were to quickly 
declare an impasse after rejection, the bankruptcy court’s 
decision will have effectively prevailed—over Second Circuit’s 
decision—to the detriment of the policies of both the 
Bankruptcy Code and the RLA.234  If the union were permitted 
to strike without having to return to the bargaining table in 
good faith, then the union would receive a leverage windfall 
that would compromise the pre-rejection leverage 
apportionment and virtually eliminate the reciprocal benefits 
that come with it.235 
On the other hand, the airline probably hopes that the 
union, following costly and potentially embarrassing § 1113 
litigation, would be enticed to compromise or simply accept the 
new court-approved terms.  In the alternative, the airline 
might also hope that the post-rejection negotiation process 
continues indefinitely.236  After all, it has already been given 
permission to institute terms that are specifically designed to 
aid in its reorganization.237  Despite this, the airline must keep 
  
 231 The union would not likely elect arbitration because it would introduce 
more uncertainty into the process.  Specifically, the union would run the risk of the 
arbitrator being sympathetic to the public interest involved if a strike occurred.  See In 
re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 350 (noting that “Northwest carries 130,000 
passengers per day, has 1,200 departures per day, is the one carrier for 23 cities in the 
country, and provides half all airline services to another 20 cities”). 
 232 Id. at 382. 
 233 The bankruptcy court in Northwest Airlines found that if the airline were 
to accept the flight attendants’ terms, that modification would not provide the airline 
with the necessary savings to avoid liquidation.  See supra note 221 and accompanying 
text. 
 234 This is because the bankruptcy court did not believe that the parties were 
required to resume RLA bargaining after rejection.  See supra note 99 and 
accompanying text.  Therefore, if the resumption of bargaining post rejection is merely 
a short-lived formality, the union is not really being required to bargain pursuant the 
district court’s order. 
 235 See supra Part III.B. 
 236 The Mediation Board has the statutory authority under the RLA to compel 
indefinite mediation.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 237 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
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in mind that the substituted terms are merely temporary.238  
This is because, per the district court’s and Second Circuit’s 
opinions in Northwest Airlines, a labor strike has not been 
enjoined ad infinitum.239  On the contrary, the courts have 
merely deferred the union’s right to strike to a later date when 
the Mediation Board has declared an impasse (i.e., that no 
further bargaining would lead to a solution).240  For this reason, 
while the airline has won the immediate battle, which was 
necessary to save money in the short-term, the union is much 
closer to being given the “green light” to strike.241 
In sum, the Second Circuit’s decision has resulted in the 
following situation: the airline continues to have an incentive 
to bargain in good faith with the union to reach a settlement.  
In contrast to the pre-rejection situation, this incentive is 
fueled not by a pressing need to cut costs (for the court has 
already done that), but by a fear that a strike is now more 
imminent.  On the other hand, the union has an incentive not 
to bargain in good faith and to reach impasse as quickly as 
possible in order to “earn” the right to strike.  Given these 
conflicting objectives, it can be said that the district court’s 
decision will help to maintain the pre-rejection status quo and 
prevent a strike.  This is possible because of the “good cause” 
requirement found in § 1113(c)(2).  
B. Strict Adherence to the “Good Cause” Requirement of 
§ 1113 
Under § 1113(c)(2), a court may not approve a rejection 
of a CBA unless it finds that the union has refused to accept 
the debtor’s proposal without “good cause.”242  This Note argues 
  
 238 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 382 (“[w]here a debtor 
succeeds in making a showing under § 1113 that rejection of its collective bargaining 
agreements is necessary to reorganization, that modification is essentially temporary; 
the debtor can implement the necessary changes [as approved by the court] only until 
the parties bargain to a new contract.”).  
 239 Id. 
 240 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Section § 1113(c)(2) refers to the debtor’s “proposal,” which is discussed in § 
1113(b).  Section § 1113(b) states in pertinent part:  
(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking 
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or 
trustee (hereinafter in this section “trustee” shall include a debtor in 
possession), shall— 
 
2007] THE RUNWAY TO SETTLEMENT 1439 
that such a finding should automatically trigger a post-
rejection presumption that the union did not act in good faith 
during pre-rejection bargaining.243  This presumption should be 
at the forefront of the Mediation Board’s mind while 
supervising post-rejection mediation and should be a major 
factor in its decision to declare an impasse.  Given the union’s 
presumptive bad faith prior to rejection, it should not be 
permitted to approach the post-rejection bargaining process 
with the sole intent of reaching impasse so that it can strike.  
In other words, the Mediation Board should be charged with a 
duty to ensure that the post-rejection bargaining process is 
truly a good faith exercise and is lengthy enough so that the 
appropriate concessions can be made.244  While the district 
court’s decision “forces” the parties to bargain post-rejection 
and explicitly preserves the Mediation Board’s exclusive power, 
  
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the 
employees covered by such agreement, based on the most complete 
and reliable information available at the time of such proposal, 
which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees 
benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the 
reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the 
debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and 
equitably; and 
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the 
employees with such relevant information as is necessary to 
evaluate the proposal. 
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal 
provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided 
for in subsection (d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the 
authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach 
mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement. 
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) (2000). 
 243 In other words, if the union had no “good cause” to refuse the airline’s 
proposal, and it did so anyway, that refusal must have been based in some “less-than-
good” cause such as greed or a desire to punish. 
 244 Shortly after the enactment of § 1113, Bankruptcy Judge Richard Merrick 
hinted at the importance of time in the § 1113 process.  See Richard L. Merrick, The 
Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
301, 362.  Judge Merrick asserted that the “key to the success” of § 1113 rests in the 
management’s ability to convince the union that wage and benefit concessions are 
required for the “future viability” of the airline and their jobs.  Id. at 362.  In addition, 
Judge Merrick hypothesized that “local situations” will govern the sacrifices that each 
party will have to make to ensure the airline’s viability.  Id. at 363.  As discussed 
above, this Note suggests that Judge Merrick’s dual propositions are absolutely correct.  
In other words, the only way for this to work—i.e., to afford the airline with the 
necessary to time to do this “convincing”—is to allow the parties to return to the pre-
rejection status quo where the Mediation Board has control over whether the union 
strikes.  In other words, the Mediation Board must anticipate and counter the union’s 
objective of hastening the post-rejection bargaining to reach impasse.  
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the courts must retain jurisdiction over the case to ensure that 
the Mediation Board is zealously exercising its statutory 
authority. 
C. What Constitutes Good Cause 
The Northwest Airlines case demonstrates why a 
presumption of bad faith is a necessary “check” on the union’s 
bargaining behavior.  In granting Northwest Airlines’ motion 
for rejection, the bankruptcy court found that “the record 
contains ample evidence that the union did not have good cause 
to reject management’s last offer.”245  Specifically, the union 
was not able to justify its refusal to accept the airline’s 
proposals.246  Despite this conclusion, the bankruptcy court 
appeared to backpedal less than two months later when it 
authorized the union to strike.  In its decision allowing the 
union to strike, the bankruptcy court asserted that it “[could] 
not be said” that the union refused to bargain in good faith.247  
The bankruptcy court based that assertion on the single fact 
that once the AFA was certified to replace the PFAA, the union 
and the airline engaged in “round-the-clock negotiations” for 
ten days to reach an agreement.248  While this observation is 
technically correct, its emphasis on procedure caused the court 
to miss the substantive point that it had observed in its prior 
decision,249 which was that bargaining that fails to address the 
needs of reorganization does not constitute good faith.250  The 
district court adeptly recognized this backpedaling as an 
obfuscation of the Mediation Board’s statutory role in the 
  
 245 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 328. 
 246 The court found that while the PFAA leadership technically endorsed the 
March 1 Agreement, the leadership actually “gave the agreement little support.”  See 
id. at 328.  In addition, the record suggests that the parties agreed on a target amount 
of wage concessions.  “Once the level of concessions is set, the only remaining question 
is how to reach the target and the value of the components.  The [airline’s] March 1 
Agreement reaches that target . . . [however,] the PFAA . . . failed to submit an 
alternative proposal that reaches that target . . . .”  See id. at 328. 
 247 See id. at 343. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See the bankruptcy court’s ruling on the debtor’s § 1113 motion supra note 
82. 
 250 An examination of the parties “good faith” must include a procedural and 
substantive analysis.  See William J. Goldsmith, et al., Tossing the Coin Under Section 
1113: Heads or Tails, the Union Wins, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1516, 1542 (1993) 
(arguing that in considering a debtor’s motion for rejection under § 1113, the court 
must address both the procedural aspects of the bargaining process and the 
substantive aspects of the union’s refusal). 
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bargaining process,251 and the Second Circuit concurred with 
that judgment.  Had the appellate courts affirmed the decision 
of the bankruptcy court, the “no good cause” requirement of 
§ 1113 would have been rendered superfluous.252  In other 
words, the bankruptcy court, as opposed to the Mediation 
Board, would have effectively given itself the authority to 
declare an impasse notwithstanding the union’s lack of good 
cause.  The Bankruptcy Code and the RLA clearly require 
greater scrutiny of the union’s bargaining behavior. 
D. Argument for a New Presumption of “Bad Faith” 
This Note suggests that this heightened scrutiny can be 
obtained through the operation of a presumption of bad faith 
following rejection.  The presumption should operate in the 
following manner: assuming that the bankruptcy court’s 
finding of “no good cause” in a § 1113 motion is factually 
correct,253 the post-rejection burden of proof should shift to the 
union to demonstrate that the factual situation has somehow 
changed and that it now has justifiable reasons for refusing to 
acquiesce to the court-approved terms.254  In other words, the 
Mediation Board should require that the union rebut this 
presumption as a pre-requisite to the declaration of an 
impasse.  This presumption would change the union’s incentive 
structure both before and after rejection.   
Prior to rejection, if the union knows that it will not 
receive a leverage windfall and will be subject to a presumption 
of bad faith following the granting of a § 1113 motion, the 
union is more likely to compromise and avoid the § 1113 
litigation altogether.255  Following rejection, the presumption 
would also weaken the unions’ incentive to treat the RLA 
bargaining as a mere formality or pretext.  As opposed to the 
  
 251 See supra text accompanying notes 104-07. 
 252 See Goldsmith, supra note 250, at 1539. 
 253 In the Northwest Airlines case, there is no reason to believe that the 
bankruptcy court’s findings underlying the § 1113 motion were incorrect given that the 
Union chose not appeal the granting of that motion.  See supra note 129. 
 254 For example, if the circumstances permitted, the union could argue that a 
sudden increase in demand for air travel has increased the airline’s profits and 
simultaneously decreased the need for labor concessions. 
 255 In the Northwest Airlines case, the five unions that reached consensual 
agreements with the airline immediately following the filing of the § 1113 motion 
demonstrated proper foresight of the consequences of rejection—they appreciated that 
their leverage was at its peak during the pre-rejection status quo.  See supra note 78 
and accompanying text. 
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pre-rejection situation where time was the enemy of the airline, 
in the post-rejection situation, time is an ally (i.e., the airline 
benefits from any post-rejection delays).  This is because the 
airline is realizing financial savings without having to make 
non-financial concessions to the union.256  Consequently, the 
presumption of bad faith would have the effect of giving the 
union an incentive to bargain in good faith following rejection. 
While the Second Circuit’s decision made the correct 
first step by allowing the Mediation Board to continue to 
participate in the process post-rejection, the courts must insist 
that the Mediation Board keep the negotiations open until the 
union has rebutted the presumption.  While courts have 
historically been reluctant to review Mediation Board 
decisions, this reluctance has been in ordering the Mediation 
Board to cease mediation and immediately declare an 
impasse.257  On the contrary, this Note suggests that courts 
scrutinize all Mediation Board “impasse decisions” in the 
RLA/bankruptcy context with the goal of extending the time for 
mediation.  By allowing the mediation process to continue 
indefinitely, the Mediation Board will allow the airline to make 
the necessary concessions and quid pro quo that will likely lead 
to a settlement.258  Both the RLA and Bankruptcy Code provide 
authority for this “extension” of bargaining time.259  Under the 
RLA, the Supreme Court has made it clear for decades that the 
purpose of the RLA is to preserve the status quo indefinitely so 
that a settlement can be reached.260  Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, the extension of post-rejection negotiations increases the 
likelihood that the airline will make non-financial concessions 
that will enhance its reorganization potential and improve its 
future operations.261   
  
 256 See, e.g., supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text (describing some of the 
cost-neutral benefits that the flight attendants can receive in exchange for giving 
financial concessions). 
 257 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 366. 
 258 See supra note 244. 
 259 With respect to the RLA, it is universally understood that bargaining can 
last indefinitely.  See supra note 62.  With respect to the § 1113 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, courts will often delay imposing new terms after approving a CBA rejection in 
order to allow the parties to bargain and reach a mutually acceptable settlement.  See 
supra note 81. 
 260 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  To date, Congress has not 
challenged that proposition by amending the RLA or limiting its operation through 
another statute. 
 261 See supra Part III.B. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note began by suggesting that the disposition of 
the Northwest Airlines case increased the likelihood that 
airlines can continue to acquire company-saving concessions.  
As the district court in Northwest Airlines articulated, and the 
Second Circuit affirmed, the acquisition of those concessions is 
contingent on the airline-debtor’s unfettered access to § 1113 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.262  While § 1113 contains internal 
mechanisms and requirements to prevent abuses on the 
debtor’s side, § 1113 lacks reciprocal mechanisms to prevent 
creditors such as labor unions from unfairly capitalizing on the 
debtor’s need for emergency relief.   
With that in mind, the Second Circuit’s decision places 
the parties in a position where the unions do not receive an 
“unearned” windfall of bargaining leverage.  Alternatively, the 
bankruptcy court’s decision creates an incentive to reach a 
settlement without court intervention.  By virtue of that 
decision, unionized employees can simultaneously increase 
their job security and receive significant, non-financial 
benefits.  At the same time, the unions have a distinct 
disincentive to litigate their labor disputes because they are 
less likely to earn a strike weapon and more likely to have 
unfavorable terms imposed upon them by the court.  
Subsequent courts can ensure that this incentive structure 
remains intact by following the framework established by the 
appellate courts in the Northwest Airlines case.  By doing so, 
and holding the parties to their statutory obligations following 
court intervention, the courts can decrease the frequency and 
lessen the effects that labor disputes have on the already 
volatile airline industry. 
Terry G. Sanders† 
  
 262 See In re Northwest Airlines, 349 B.R. at 346 (“[It would be] ironic . . . for 
the Court to conclude . . . that a debtor’s lawful resort to a Bankruptcy Code provision 
meant to keep an insolvent business running while it reorganizes its debts would serve 
as the automatic trigger point to end the procedures Congress mandated to govern 
amicable settlement of major labor disputes involving carriers, and thereby prompt an 
immediate strike that could spell doom by liquidation to that airline.”). 
 † B.A. Colgate University, 2005; J.D. candidate, 2008, Brooklyn Law School.  
Thanks to everyone at the Brooklyn Law Review for their efforts, Professor Edward 
Janger for helping me get this topic off the ground, Dean Michael Gerber for his 
guidance and limitless connections, Ellen Zurich for her unique insight, and my friends 
and family for their love and support. 
